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INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS AND THE FAILED
PROMISE OF DISINTERMEDIATION
CHRISTINE HURT*
This Article argues that although the Internet works well to
eliminate intermediariesformerly necessaryfor distribution,
the Internet cannot reliably eliminate intermediaries used by
the public for creating demand networks and establishing
third-partycertijfication. As those who have tried to sidestep
powerful intermediaries in both the securities industry and
other industries have discovered, these intermediariesplay a
substantial role in cultivating consumer preferences and
gaining consumer trust. In this age of overwhelming
numbers of consumer choices, consumers rely on demand
intermediariesto make decisionsfor them.
I. INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of this millennium, the future of initial public
offerings ("iPOs") conducted using an Internet-based auction method in the
United States seemed very bright.1 Although the number of auction IPOs
had remained small since being allowed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission in 1999,2 this method was experiencing a resurgence brought
about in small part by the improving economy and market for IPOs and in
large part by the marketing buzz surrounding the launching of the auction
IPO in 2004 for Google, Inc.3 Auctions, which allocate IPO shares to
anonymous buyers on the basis of sealed bids, promised to create an era in
which retail investors were able to purchase IPO shares at their market-

. Associate Professor of Law and Richard W. and Marie L. Corman Scholar, University
of Illinois College of Law.
1See Mark Lewis, Online 1PO Revolution Postponed,FORBES.COM, Mar. 14, 2001,

http://www.forbes.com/markets/2001/03/14/03]4banks.html

(reporting that Walt

Cruttenden, CEO of E*Offering, had predicted that by 2002, "80 % of IPOs would be
[completed] online").
2 The first no-action letter issued by the SEC to an underwriter purporting to offer
equity shares in an initial public auction was to Wit Capital in 1999, and it allowed
online auctions in IPOs although technically SEC rules concerning the timing of offers
and sales of securities did not correspond with an ongoing bidding mechanism. See Wit
Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
77,577 at 78,906 (July 14, 1999).
'See Review & Outlook: Google's Dutch Treat, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2004, at A20.
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driven opening prices. 4 Because IPO shares would not be pre-allocated to
friends, family and employees of the issuer and, more disturbingly, to
valued customers or customers-to-be of the underwriter,5 the public
offering system would no more be a mechanism for insiders to distribute
built-in-profits to cronies via underpriced IPO shares.
Although the market saw an increased number of auction IPOs in6
2005, the market for online IPO auctions again stalled beginning in 2006.
In addition, even the record number of 2005 auction IPOs is miniscule
compared with the number of IPOs conducted in the U.S. using the
traditional bookbuilding method.7 Proponents of these IPOs must explain
why the auction IPO model has not challenged, much less replaced,
bookbuilding as the dominant offering method in the U.S.
Critics of the auction IPO explain that the popularity of the auction
model has stalled because it is inferior to bookbuilding. 8 This argument
asserts that auction IPOs do not live up to their marketing; auctions are
neither more democratic nor more efficient.
However, this argument
usually centers around the idiosyncrasies of the Google auction, 9 which was
not a true auction IPO, and few other data points. From the few online
IPOs for which there is data, the median first-day pop does suggest that
issuers opting for online IPOs are able to capture market demand more
efficiently than the bookbuilding method can. In addition, in every other
online IPO besides Google, access by retail investors to original IPO shares
has been handled in a democratic fashion, and even the Google auction
resulted in far more widespread retail access than most IPOs. Accordingly,
watchers of IPOs must develop another explanation for the anemic growth
of the auction IPO industry.

4 See Christine Hurt, Moral Hazardand the Initial Public Offering, 26 CARDOZO L.
REv. 711, 769 (2005) ("The availability of online IPO auction mechanisms promises a
much more democratic IPO process whereby the larger public has the opportunity to
participate.").
5 See Sean J. Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing:A Legal and Economic Analysis of
the PreferentialAllocation of Shares in Initial Public Offerings, 69 BROOK. L. REV.
583, 594 (2004) ("By granting highly profitable 1PO allocations to savvy businesspeople who well understand that nothing in this world is free, underwriters can expect
real returns on their investment in goodwill.").
6 Two U.S. firms chose the online auction method for their IPOs in 2006, compared
with five in 2005. In 2007, three firms chose this method. The average number of
online IPOs in each year during the period 1999-2006 is 2.33.
7 In 2005, the record number of online 1PO auctions, five, represented 2.5% of the
overall IPO market. The market saw 194 companies going public that year. See
Renaissance Capital's 2006 Annual 1PO Review,
http://www.ipohome.com/marketwatch/review/2006review.asp (last visited Nov. 27,
2007) (listing the number ofU.S. IPOs in 2005 as 194).
8 Peter B. Oh, The Dutch Auction Myth, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 853, 875 (2007).
9 See id at 8, 21 (analyzing the Google auction but noting that it "featured peculiarities
that delimit its utility as a case study").
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Technology, and the Internet specifically, has long created
expectations of disintermediation in many contexts. Just like buyers and
sellers that flocked to eBay, producers and consumers have longed to
harness the potential of the Internet to "cut out the middle man." By
creating new ways to distribute and market products directly to the intended
audiences, markets seek efficiencies by eliminating added fees to
intermediaries who add little value in the current age. In addition,
producers yearn to use new technologies to bypass industry gatekeepers that
rely on outdated networks to select small numbers of products to pass on to
consumers who might prefer the products that were not selected. In a world
in which a buyer would choose to pay a certain price (X) for a product, the
producer of that product would prefer to capture as close to 100% of X as
possible and not share unnecessarily with intermediaries.
The market for initial public offerings is no different from other
markets. A small number of investment banks and the underwriters and
brokers they employ act as intermediaries that distribute and market
offerings for a substantial fee.1 0 In addition to underwriting fees, which are
standard across Wall Street banks and much higher than in other countries,
investment banks also profit from the bookbuilding system by being able to
set IPO share prices much lower than market demand and allocating this
built-in profit to clients and friends." Furthermore, because of great ties
between underwriters and analysts, these intermediaries may also act as
gatekeepers, determining which offerings will be successful in the aftermarket. However, auction IPOs have the potential of allowing issuers to
avoid these investment banks and sell directly to the public at the market
price (X), not the bookbuilding underprice (some percentage of X), minus
the substantial underwriting fee. Issuers would then capture the entire
proceeds (closer to 100% of X) from their offering instead of sharing it with
clients of investment banks. So, with the potential for revolution inherent
in the Internet, this Article examines why the Internet's promise of
disintermediation has not been fulfilled for IPOs.
This Article argues that although the Internet works well to
eliminate intermediaries formerly necessary for distribution, the Internet
cannot reliably eliminate intermediaries used by the public for creating
demand networks and establishing third-party certification. As those who
have tried to sidestep powerful intermediaries in both the securities industry
and other industries have discovered, these intermediaries play a substantial
role in cultivating consumer preferences and gaining consumer trust. In this
age of overwhelming numbers of consumer choices, consumers rely on
10The industry standard in the U.S. is for underwriters to charge a flat fee of 7.0% of
the total offering. See

PATRICK SCHULTHEIS, ET AL., THE INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING: A
GUIDEBOOK FOR EXECUTIVES AND BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 27 (2d ed. Bowne 2004).

11See Griffith, supra note 5, at 594-97 (discussing how underwriters "maximize
welfare" by underpricing offerings in order to generate goodwill with customers by
allocating to them discounted iPO shares with built-in gains).
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demand intermediaries to make decisions for them. Therefore, the base
market price (X) of any product will be increased (X+Y) because of the
actions of these demand networks. Therefore, a producer must determine
whether more profit is to be made by sharing revenues with intermediaries
and receiving some percentage (A) of the increased price (X+Y) than by
capturing 100% of merely X. In addition, to attempt to ignore these
intermediaries comes with great risk, especially when the intermediaries
retaliate, as is the case with the Wall Street investment banks with regard to
auction IPOs. In certain cases, those who attempt to sidestep intermediaries
may find themselves capturing not 100% (X) but 100% of a depressed
market price (X-Z).

II. DISINTERMEDIATION AND THE INTERNET
In both the marketplace for goods and services and the marketplace
for ideas, intermediaries have been around for a long time. Intermediaries
help certain goods "get to market," and other intermediaries connect
consumers with these goods. A producer of a better-tasting peanut butter
can sell only to someone looking for a better-tasting peanut butter through a
series of intermediaries that can place the jar and the buyer in the same
location and communicate to the buyer the superiority of the product.
Intermediaries have also played a part in the dissemination of, and
unfortunately in the acceptance of, ideas. Besides the speaker on the
platform in Hyde Park, most ideas must also travel through a series of
intermediaries before reaching the general audience. The most beautiful
piece of music will be heard only by a handful of listeners without
intermediaries to carry it to a wider audience.
Professor Lawrence Solum divides intermediaries into two groups:
source intermediaries and search intermediaries. 12 These two groups
correlate roughly with the concepts of supply intermediaries, which
facilitate bringing products to market, and demand intermediaries, which
assist those in the marketplace looking for certain products. To bring a
product or an idea to market, supply intermediaries work through
distribution networks unknown or inaccessible to the producer. On the
other end, demand intermediaries convey information to consumers, who
are either passively or actively acquiring information with which to make
purchasing decisions.
Although Professor Solum's search (demand)
intermediaries seem objectively neutral and may exclude certain products
indirectly, 13 in some industries demand intermediaries are associated with
12See Lawrence B. Solum, Download It While It's Hot: Open Access and Legal
Scholarship, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 841, 850 (2006).
13For

example, Professor Solum cites Westlaw and LexisNexis as examples of demand

intermediaries that assist legal scholars to find relevant source materials. Id at 853.
However, these databases, while enormous, are not exhaustive, and some secondary
journals, smaller publications, or publications in nonlegal fields will not be accessible
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supply intermediaries and work intentionally to increase connections
between consumers and certain products.
Whether this screening is
intentional or not, or even valuable or not, these helpful and unhelpful
intermediaries increase the price of goods and services to consumers and
may eliminate some product choices by increasing transaction costs for
producers.
The Internet has helped immensely to free some producers and
consumers from these intermediary costs.
Technology has enabled
producers to inform consumers of their products at much less cost,
decreased the costs of distribution, and increased the speed of distribution.
Instead of scouring shelves in bookstores for a certain book, consumers can
purchase from a volume dealer on the Internet at discount prices in the time
it takes to search for the book by title. In addition, purveyors of news and
commentary now have the ability to reach wide audiences through blogs
and on-line magazines at a fraction of the cost of creating a printed
periodical or selling a piece to a printed periodical.
However, this disintermediation has been anything but complete.
Although technology has greatly decreased the cost of distributing products
and ideas, technology has not been able to eliminate intermediaries entirely.
Both source intermediaries and demand intermediaries provide functions
beyond mere connection of buyers and sellers. Some intermediaries
function as reputational intermediaries 4 that vouch for the value of the
product or the idea being distributed. These reputational intermediaries
may be source intermediaries, such as high-end clothing boutiques that
feature certain brands of clothing, or demand intermediaries, such as real
estate buyers' brokers who show their clients properties they believe meet
their selective criteria. In fact, the Internet has created new reputational
intermediaries to replace those that have been eliminated. 15 Buyers may be
able to bypass a storefront when purchasing a particular appliance, but
websites such as Epinions.com1 6 may perform the same function as a
using these tools. In addition, because of individual contracting, some popular sources
are available full-text using one source but not the other. This is the case with the Wall
Street Journal,which is available only in abstract form on Westlaw.
14 See

Clayton P. Gillette, Reputation and Intermediariesin Electronic Commerce, 62
LA. L. REV. 1165, 1166-67 (2002) (describing the ongoing need for reputational
intermediaries as important to the future of e-commerce because "[n]otwithstanding
expectations that the Internet would vaporize boundaries, the need for buyers and sellers
to trust each other where compliance with contractual terms cannot readily be verified
ex ante or enforced ex post diminishes the likelihood of trade").
5 See Mark S. Nadel, The ConsumerProductSelection Process in an Internet Age:
Obstacles to Maximum Effectiveness and Policy Options, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 183,
185-87 (2000) (discussing the emergence of online "infomediaries" and "selection
assistants" to guide consumers "overwhelmed by the multitude of choices and
abundance of data about those choices").
16 www.Epinions.com ("At Epinions, you can read and write reviews on
millions of
products and services.").
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salesman in attempting to give the buyer information and reviews of certain
products. In a perfect cyber world, these new intermediaries do not add
costs to the purchase, as does paying the mark-up the storefront charges, but
when the producers are advertising on these websites 17 or paying a fee to be
evaluated, 18 the price of the product must eventually reflect those producer
costs.
Part of the failure of auction IPOs is explained by the inability of
the online auction to eliminate the need for demand intermediaries generally
and reputational intermediaries specifically.
When reputational
intermediaries are objective and rent their reputations to those valuable
products and services that deserve the vouching, then the cost of those
intermediaries
is warranted.
However, sometimes reputational
intermediaries use their position to create the value that they are vouching
for. Those intermediaries come at a substantial cost to consumers and
producers alike. This Article contends that a greater part of the failure of
auction IPOs comes from the danger of avoiding the demand intermediary's
ability to create its own demand network for products it has chosen to
declare valuable. In industries in which consumer choices are virtually
dependent on these demand networks, those who bypass the intermediaries
will suffer. This Article argues that the securities industry is such an
industry.
A. DistributionNetworks
The most obvious impact of the Internet on eliminating the need for
intermediaries has come in the form of bypassing distribution networks.
The Internet fulfills the clich6 of cutting out the middleman. Residents all
over the globe, in small towns and big cities, can order products over the
Internet directly from manufacturers or large-scale merchants without
having a distributor nearby. Through the magic of electronic commerce and
competition in parcel shipping, producers do not need to enter into
numerous agreements with various intermediaries in the chain of
distribution. Without the costs of maintaining duplicative storefronts and
personnel, sites such as Amazon.com have revolutionized retail shopping.
Even shoe shopping, which may seem particularly suited to face-to-face
service, has been transformed by Zappos.com, which offers free shipping
for both orders and returns.
The same phenomenon has occurred in the dissemination of ideas
as well as products. Blogs and online magazines have changed the
marketing of news and commentary completely, with even major
17On a recent visit to Epinions, the "Digital Cameras" page in "Electronics" was

"Sponsored by Panasonic: Ideas for Life." See
http://www.epinions.com/Digital Cameras (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
i See, Gillette, supra note 14, at 1172 (describing the costs of sending reputation
signals through intermediaries).

2008]

INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGSAND THE FAILED PROMISE OF

709

DISIATTERMEDIATIOAT

newspapers and magazines being forced to provide at least free limited
content on the Internet to compete. Consumers of information no longer
need to subscribe to numerous expensive cable news programs, newspapers
and magazines to receive current information. On the other hand, any
individual who wants to disseminate important news can do so rather
quickly, without having to be selected as one of a handful of opinion writers
that appear in a major newspaper.
B. Demand Networks
The Internet has not been as successful in eliminating the need for
demand intermediaries that either use their reputation to vouch for certain
products or ideas, or who cultivate increased demand for those products or
ideas. Online news sites hosted by major newspapers and magazines
generally get more traffic than sites created from whole cloth by unknown
authors. Online retail outlets generally succeed by offering the same
branded products found in stores, only at lower prices. Few success stories
exist of unknown producers selling a new product over the Internet without
demand intermediaries.
C. Success Stories: eBay, Stephen King, & SSRN

1. eBay
The poster child for disintermediation on the Internet is eBay, Inc.,
"the world's online marketplace," an internet swap meet where sellers pay a
fee to eBay to list and sell merchandise directly to sellers. Although eBay
itself acts as a functional intermediary by providing the website, it insists
that it is merely a forum. Since its inception in 1995, eBay has grown to
dominate the online auction market. In 2006, eBay reported consolidated
net revenue of $6 billion and net income of $1.1 billion. 19 This revenue
comprises earnings from eBay, PayPal and other holdings. EBay's revenue
is derived mainly from fees eBay charges sellers who use the eBay auction
site. In the last quarter of 2006, eBay boasted a "confirmed registered user
base" of 222 million users, and 610 million products were listed on eBay,
generating $14.4 billion in sales revenue to the sellers.20
The success of eBay lies mainly in its disintermediation of
distribution networks and in its ability to capitalize on existing demand
networks. Primarily, sellers of goods on eBay are able to locate interested
buyers easily without the added costs of consigners and advertising and
19See

eBay Inc. Announces Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2006 Financial Results,

http://investor.ebay.com/financial releases.cfm (the follow "eBay Inc. Announces
Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2006 Financial Results") (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
20 See id.
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without the geographical limitations of flea markets and yard sales. The
original model of eBay seemed to be aimed at these types of sellers: sellers
of collectibles and other items not always commercially available.'
However, many of the popular products on eflay are products that either are
22
currently available at local retail stores or that were available recently.
These sellers also benefit from being able to sell directly to interested
customers without search costs on either side. Theoretically, consumers
should be able to obtain goods at a cost less than they would otherwise, and
sellers should be able to obtain a price higher than they would otherwise.
How these gains are distributed between the buyer and the seller will differ
23

in each transaction.
However, eBay users do not eliminate demand networks, nor do
they need to. Sellers do not have to create demand for their products; they

simply respond to existing demand by selling items they have bought and
used or by selling items that they specifically purchased to resell at a profit.
Many eBay sellers even use pictures of items copied from online sites
hosted by original manufacturers or retailers, capitalizing on investments
previously made in creating demand.

Sellers create niches where demand

currently exists.
eBay

Many legal scholars have studied the ways in which commerce on
seems to flow without the true presence of reputational

intermediaries. 24 EBay has gone to great lengths to describe itself as "only
a venue."'25 Although eflay itself does not investigate or vouch for the
21See Steven Anderson et al., Seller Strategies on eBay 2 (U.C. Santa Cruz Dept. of

Econ., Working Paper No. 564, Apr. 2004, availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract-531702
("The image of online auctions has expanded beyond that of a web-based garage sale or
swap meet, focusing on collectibles or unique items, to one where entrepreneurs are
seeking to launch or enhance 'e-tail' businesses in direct competition with traditional
retail markets.").
22 On May 21, 2007, the ten most popular searches on eBay were "webkinz," "apple
ipod," "xbox 360," "wii," "ps3," "louis vuitton," "nintendo wii," and "cars." See eBay,
eBay Pulse, http://pulse.ebay.com (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
23 See Ravi Bapna, Wolfgang Jank & Galit Shmueli, Consumer Surphs in Online
Auctions (Nov. 1, 2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract-840264 (quantifying consumer
surplus on eBay as an average of$15.59 per transaction in their sample of 4514 eBay
auctions using a web based tool to measure successful winning bids against the highest
bid the winner made). Seller surplus would be harder to measure, although many
auctions have a "reserve" price. See id. (assuming that the resulting auction price
reflects some seller surplus, given the reservation price and the assumption that sellers
behave rationally in choosing to list products on eBay).
24 See Gillette, supra note 14, at 1177-92 (evaluating eBay's feedback mechanism as a
substitute for reputational intermediaries and finding that although the mechanism "has
overcome significant costs in generating reputational information that facilitates trade,"
positive signals of seller trustworthiness are noisy given that "more than 99 percent of
registered comments are positive").
25 See Mary M. Calkins, My Reputation Always Had More Fun Than Me: The Failure
of EBay's Feedback Model to Effectively Prevent Online Auction Fraud,7 RICH. J.L. &
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creditworthiness of either the seller or the buyer,26 the website does have an
important feedback function whereby buyers and sellers are encouraged to
leave positive, neutral or negative feedback regarding a specific transaction.
This feedback is aggregated to give each user a score, which is shown to
prospective transaction parties. However, studies have shown that this
feedback mechanism is probably flawed, creating a system where most
users have entirely positive feedback or almost entirely positive feedback. 7
Because of the reduced incentives of participants to warn others compared
with the incentives to increase their own feedback score, 2 almost all

TECH. 33, at 28 (Spring 2001), availableat
http://Iaw.richmond.edu/jolt/v7i4/notel .html (quoting the user agreement as of 2001 as
stating "eBay acts as a link between the buyer and seller. We just provide the
automated bidding system. We do not authenticate users, we do not verify items, we do
not guarantee that you will receive payment or the item.").
The eBay User Agreement as of June 28, 2007 reads:
You will not hold eBay responsible for other users' actions or inactions, including
things they post. You acknowledge that we are not a traditional auctioneer. Instead, the
Sites are a venue to allow anyone to offer, sell, and buy just about anything, at anytime,
from anywhere, in a variety of pricing formats and venues, such as stores, fixed price
formats and auction-style formats. We are not involved in the actual transaction
between buyers and sellers. We have no control over and do not guarantee the quality,
safety or legality of items advertised, the truth or accuracy of listings, the ability of
sellers to sell items, the ability of buyers to pay for items, or that a buyer or seller will
actually complete a transaction. See Your User Agreement,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-agreement.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
26 In response to buyer complaints, eBay, which has historically responded
to its feepaying clients, sellers, has recently announced long-awaited reforms, including
requiring all sellers to register with PayPal, a subsidiary of eBay Inc., which will retain
either credit card information or bank account information for each seller. See Brad
Stone, EBay Says Its Crackdown on FraudIs Showing Results, N.Y. TIMES, June 14,
2007, at C1.
27 EBay has recently revamped the feedback mechanism to require buyers to rate the
transaction on four dimensions: item description, communication, shipping and
shipping charges. See id. (reporting that the more complex feedback mechanism has
resulted in feedback being given in 10 % fewer transactions).
28 In a quick survey of the 19 items listed that were retrieved under the search "indygo
artwear," of the ten sellers represented, three had explicit instructions regarding leaving
feedback. One seller, "punkietmama" of the eBay store Princess Punkie-T's Closet,
included the following under "About Us": "Please leave me positive feedback to let me
know that you have received your item(s) and most importantly that you are happy with
your purchase. I will conclude our transaction by doing the same for you." (Item #
320131964861). The other two's instructions were less explicit. Sashabluel3 simply
stated "Feedback left after buyer leaves feedback." (Item # 110143769763).
Spendingurmoney was also straightforward: "Feedback will be left for buyer after
feedback is left for me." (Item #230147155620). Interestingly, fact-based feedback by
the seller on the buyer's performance could be provided as soon as the seller receives
payment, which is prior to delivery. No reason exists for the seller to wait until the
buyer has received delivery and posted feedback before leaving seller's feedback except
to (1) incentivize buyer to leave feedback at all; (2) incentivize buyer to leave positive
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feedback is positive and therefore, probably worthless. Regardless, users
continue to consummate transactions on eBay without the presence of either
third-party monitoring or easy enforcement mechanisms. 29
However, this is not to say that eBay has eliminated the need for
reputational intermediaries to certify the quality of products. Because the
vast majority of products sold on eBay have an existing market outside of
eBay, others vouch for the substantive quality of those products. Buyers of
iPods on eBay do not need eBay to vouch for the quality of a "new in the
box" iPod. Those consumers can get information from the Apple website,
trade magazines, and countless review websites. Consumers may rely
merely on the Apple brand to vouch for quality.30 In each transaction, the
eBay user must trust that (1) the buyer will pay the purchase price within a
certain amount of time, (2) the seller will send the product upon payment
within a certain amount of time, and (3) the product will match the
description, whether "new in the box," "gently used," "plays great," or
something similar. When feedback is negative, the substance of the remark
generally reveals that the transaction was not consummated because of
either nonpayment or nondelivery. However, negative feedback does not
correspond to the substantive quality of the new or used product, such as
the fact that the iPod seems to break shortly after the warranty expires or
that iTunes is a complicated and limiting music service.
Although eBay does represent a breakthrough in the reselling of
branded merchandise, it does not predict much about the ability of the
Internet to eliminate the need for intermediaries in the initial dissemination
of original or one-of-a-kind products. Because IPO shares are not branded
commodities, the lessons of eBay, even though it is an auction market, may
not be analogous.
2. Stephen King
As stated earlier, the Internet holds promise for direct dissemination
of not only products but also, and possibly more importantly, ideas. Many
feedback; and (3) tailor feedback on buyer's performance (payment) to the tone and
substance of buyer's feedback on seller's performance (delivery of conforming
product).

29See Susan Block-Lieb, E-Reputation: Building Trust inElectronic Commerce,
62

LA. L. REV. 1199, 1206-08 (2002) (arguing that the eBay feedback mechanism works in
"forgiv[ing] minor deviations in performance obligations" and in highlighting the
relatively rare, but much more substantial, deviations that amount to fraud or
nonperformance).
30 Unfortunately, this type of unrelated reputational mechanism also works
to reward
sellers of fake goods. EBay has recently implemented reforms aimed at screening out
sellers of counterfeit goods in categories such as clothing and handbags. See Stone,
supra note 26, at C1 (positing that eBay was incentivized to change its hands-off
approach after the percentage of active users participating in auctions fell from 41
percent in 2005 to 36 percent in 2006).
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people desire easy publication of original ideas in the forms of both
scholarly commentary and original works of art such as books, poetry,
music, and the visual arts. Anyone who has ever tried to have a book
published will have stories of the numerous go-betweens who reject, stall,
or ruin the book, or who collectively take so much of the revenues that the
author feels as if she writes for free.'
If the Internet could help authors
avoid some of these intermediaries, then more books would be available
32
and authors would recoup more of the proceeds from those works.
In
addition, readers would spend less per book without intermediary fees,
printing, and binding, so the public might purchase more books from
various authors.33
Theoretically, both the producer and the consumer
would win in a disintermediated world of book publishing.34
On the other hand, in a world where a thousand (or million) literary
flowers bloom on the Internet, consumers must find a way to sort through to
find books that fit their tastes. Although one should not judge a book by its
cover, judging books without covers, or even strategic product placement at
book stores, is very hard to do. In the world of publishing, publishers and
bookstores act as reputational intermediaries to both vouch for the literary

31 See

David D. Kirkpatrick, With Plot Still Sketchy, Characters Vie for Roles; The

Struggles Over E-Books Abound, Though ReadershipRemains Elusive, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 27, 2000, at C1 ("Whenever two or more authors are in the same room, the
conversation eventually turns to the failings of publishers: low advances, stingy
marketing, hasty editing and, most of all, rejection letters.").
32 In addition, each intermediary would like to avoid the others: publishers would
like
to avoid printers, bookstores and agents; booksellers would like to avoid publishers,
printers and agents, etc. See id at C1 (describing how "[a]fter decades of bruising
battles among agents, publishers and booksellers over the stagnant revenue from slowgrowing book sales, no one wants to see their rivals get a jump on them" in the nascent
electronic book industry).
33Self-publishing may take two forms. An author may print and bind the book herself,
then sell directly to readers through websites or other direct marketing, or an author
may sell electronic copies of the book directly from a website. The former type of selfpublishing may eventually involve other intermediaries, such as bookstores or online
booksellers. Online publishers provide a hybrid form of publishing whereby authors
contract with the electronic publisher to distribute and market their books electronically,
for a higher royalty than traditional publishing. See Mary B.W. Tabor, Big Advance?
No, Thanks, He'll PublishIt Himself N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2000, § 3, at 4 (reporting
that "while e-publishing sites typically offer no advance, they give more generous
royalties often about 40 percent" than the typical 10-15 percent royalty offered by
major publishers).
34One of the early champions of electronic publishing was Jason Epstein, former
Random House editor and inventor of the quality paperback, which revolutionized and
democratized reading. In a 2001 book, Epstein published a series of lectures he gave in
October 1999 at the New York Public Library on the unlimited possibilities for authors
that the Internet could hold. See generally JASON EPSTEIN, BOOK BUSINESS:
PUBLISHING PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (2001); see also Dinita Smith, A Vision for

Books That Exults in Happenstance,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2001, at B19.

714

ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LA W
JOURNAL

[Vol. 2:2

quality of works and create demand networks for new works.35 Substantial
sums are spent on marketing at various levels: publishers buy advertising,
bookstores create special displays, authors are sent on book tours, and even
online discount booksellers like Amazon try to steer repeat buyers to new
works that may be similar. The lone book sold through a single website
may be merely crying in the cyber-wilderness.
Therefore, only an established author would be able to avoid these
demand networks of publishing and have success selling directly to the
public. Interestingly, only a small few have tried. 6 The most famous
attempt was made by Stephen King. King is arguably one of the most wellknown contemporary authors in the United States and has written over 50
bestselling horror novels, many of which have been made into feature films
and television mini-series. King has a pre-existing demand network of
devoted fans who know with some certainty that any new offering will be
substantially similar in tone, quality and plot development to earlier works,
and this entices them into reading. King also has a popular website and
newsletter that enables him to communicate directly with his fan base.
In March 2000, King made his first foray into selling electronic
books directly to readers by offering Riding the Bullet, a 16,000 word story,
online for $2.50. 3 7 Notably, King allowed Simon & Schuster to sell the
book online, spreading some of the technological hassles to the publisher.
The book sold over 500,000 copies, much more than the 10,000 copies that
an extremely successful electronic book might sell 38 or the 20,000 that a
respectable "midlist" hardback would sell, 39 but many readers also received
copies for free from other downloaders or from hackers. Technology made
it simply too easy to distribute original works online, even copyrighted
works. However, the success of Riding the Bullet prompted King to try epublishing again later that year, this time with a serialized work of fiction
called The Plant and this time without a publisher. 40 King promised readers
35See Shira Boss, The Greatest Mystery: Making a Best Seller, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,

2007, § 3, at I(describing how publishing houses have to pick and choose which books
to publish and market heavily due to low profit margins in the industry).
36Although this section of the Article focuses on individual authors, several sites have
emerged that aim to electronically publish multiple authors' works directly to readers,
such as Hard Shell Word Factory, Booklocker.com and Xlibris. See id
37See M. J. Rose, Stephen King,the E-Publisher, WIRED, June 11, 2000,

http://www.wired.com/print/culture/lifestyle/news/2000/06/36915.

38See David D. Kirkpatrick, A Stephen King Online Horror Tale Turns Into a MiniDisaster,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2000, at Cl.
39See Boss, supra note 35, § 3, at 1 (describing one best-seller, Prep, as selling 133,000
copies in hardback and 329,000 copies inpaperback, while a midlist book will capture

"respectable sales of 15,000 to 20,000 copies").

40 See Rose, supra note 37. King was quoted at the time of the announcement of his
first
self-publishing venture that itwould be "Big Publishing's worst nightmare." Efiction: A Sensitive Plant?, THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Dec. 23, 2000, at 8. King
was well aware that he might be taking a giant leap for authors everywhere. See id at
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that new chapters would appear on his website as long as the readers kept
paying for the chapters and not downloading for free. 4 ' The first chapters
were $1 each, and the first chapter sold more than 120,000 copies in its first
week.42
By the fourth chapter, however, less than 50% of users
downloading paid the fee, and King announced a hiatus, leaving devoted
readers without an ending.43
The book has never been finished, as of
almost seven years later.
Commentators struggled to determine whether King's experiment
was a success or a failure.44
One obvious criticism of even King's
electronic publishing was the ability of determined readers to download and
disseminate works for free. Another criticism questioned whether readers
have long enough attention spans for serialized works, although King has
written successful serials before.4 5 Some critics argued that even Stephen
King could not bypass the marketing value of a publisher.46 Still others
47
implied that a publisher could have added value other than marketing,
presumably pressure to complete the book and satisfy fans.
Whether King's experiment was successful or not, it still has little
relevance for the future of electronic publishers and for the vast majority of
authors without the name recognition and established fan base of Stephen
King. 48 By analogy, his experiment was so unique as to provide little
guidance for other unseasoned and unknown producers of ideas or products
8. ("If I could break some trail for all the midlist writers, literary writers and just plain
marginalised writers who see a future outside the mainstream, that's great.").
41 See Kirkpatrick, Horror Tale, supra note 38 , at Cl (explaining that under King's
downloading honor system, he promised to keep writing chapters as long as 75% or
more of users downloading paid a $1 for each download).
42 See id.
41 See id. (noting that the fourth installment, which was longer, cost $2, an unexpected
increase that may have frustrated readers).
44 Financially, The Plant was a success by most authors' standards, earning $500,000 in
revenues with fewer costs and all profits going to the author. See David D. Kirkpatrick,
Stephen King's E-Tale Didn't Do Too Shabbily, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2000, at C11.
45 See Kirkpatrick, Horror Tale, supra note 38, at C1.
46
See id. (quoting King's own assistant as explaining that "Even for Stephen King,
making people aware that this is out there is a challenge .... That is one reason why I
am sure that Stephen King would never give up traditional publishing. They provide a
huge service, actually selling the work.").
47 See id. (quoting Jane Friedman, chief executive of Harper Collins Publishers as
saying "a publisher brings quite a lot to the table - starting with the editing process and
including marketing and publicity and all the advice and wherewithal").
48 Shortly after King began his self-publishing experiment, but before he announced The
Plant'shiatus, best-selling novelist Frederick Forsyth announced that he would
electronically publish five short stories through Online Originals. The author of such
books as The Day of the Jackal, who notably did not use computers, soon became
frustrated with the medium and the new electronic intermediaries and abandoned
electronic publishing. See Stuart Wavell, A JackalAmong the Geeks, TIMES (LONDON),
Nov. 19, 2000 ("1 don't think these young geeks know how to promote a product. The
conventional publishers, of course, have been doing it for years.").
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looking to avoid demand networks on the Internet. However, if Stephen
King was unable to avoid publishing houses' demand networks, as some
critics charge, then ultimately no other author will be able to do it, either. If
King was successful, or is successful in the future with a non-serialized
novel, 49 then the success will be more attributable to King's stature in the
world of horror fiction
than to the power of the Internet to disintermediate
50
book publishing.
3. SSRN
In the academic world, online scholarship databases have
revolutionized the field of social science research. Instead of relying on
physical or electronic libraries that purchase subscriptions to scholarly
journals, researchers can now access free databases that compile working
and final papers of scholars in several disciplines. Although a few papers
that are published elsewhere are available only for a fee, their abstracts are
freely available. In addition, most papers are available in their entirety
without a fee. One of these databases is the Social Science Research
Network ("SSRN"), which was created in 1994. 5'
SSRN not only bypasses the expense of traditional scholarship
intermediaries such as academic publishers and libraries, but it also
increases the volume and pace of distribution to other scholars. Professor
Solum describes the publishers such as journals and academic presses as
source intermediaries and the library services and online subscription

49See Mark Chadbourn, Online PublishingPuts a Chill Down Book World's Spine,
THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Nov. 29, 2000, at 2 ("King is just having some fun,
scaring the publishers. He hasn't even tried to market his best work. He described The
Plant as an update of some old work he had lying around, and left it outside his yard

with an honesty box for donations. He's having a great time, and he can't lose. But
what would happen if he went full-on?").
50A slightly different example ofa successful venture into self-publishing is the story
of
Benjamin Kaplan, a high-school student who amassed $90,000 in college scholarships
to the university of his choice. After graduating in 1999 from Harvard University debtfree, Kaplan self-published Hiow to Go to College Almostfor Free: The Secrets of
Winning Scholarship Money. Kaplan's parents used their untapped college savings to
help Kaplan print and bind the niche book, which he then marketed himself. The first
edition sold more than 25,000 copies, with the assistance of retailers such as
Amazon.com. See Tabor, supra note 33, § 3, at 4. Although at the time, Kaplan
resisted efforts from publishing houses to re-launch his book and capitalize on his
success, the 2002 edition was published by Harper Collins. Although his selfpublishing efforts resulted in a respectable number of copies sold, Kaplan did not
divulge the profits received from his experiment. See id at 4 ("Quite frankly, I've been
too busy and haven't had a chance to figure out how much money we have or have not
made so far").
51Other such databases include the National Bureau of Economics Research (NBER)
and Berkeley Electronic Press (BEPress).
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databases such as Westlaw and LexisNexis as search intermediaries. 52 The
source intermediaries, or supply intermediaries, inhibit distribution by
acting as somewhat imperfect gatekeepers, selecting certain articles and
books for publication while rejecting others. Some journals, such as law
reviews run by law students, may not act as competent gatekeepers. 5 3 In
addition, peer-reviewed journals have their own biases and politics. 4 As a
result, some undeserving works are chosen for publication while deserving
works may go unpublished 5
Previously, rejected works were not
accessible to other scholars until they were finally published, if at all. With
the rise of SSRN, these works are stored with all other works and are
equally accessible. Therefore, a notable work will not languish in true
obscurity, as often times others will publish later works that supplant its
original ideas 6
In addition to inefficient sorting of articles, traditional supply
intermediaries have also distributed articles at an inefficient pace. Although
student-run journals make publication decisions more quickly than peerreviewed journals, publication time remains between six and twelve months
from submission. Articles in peer-reviewed journals appear in press even
later.
Through SSRN, articles can be accessible to readers almost
instantaneously upon uploading by the author.
Although research scholars are generally in a better position than
purchasers of consumer goods to identify useful products, scholars have
relied on search intermediaries and demand intermediaries, to help match
their known preferences with a catalogued body of scholarship. These
demand intermediaries range from the crude, such as the card catalog and
the index to legal periodicals, to the sophisticated (and more costly), such as
Westlaw, LexisNexis and Hein Online. Through author and word searches,
researchers can eventually find their way to the full text of useful
scholarship. Although SSRN does not have the sophisticated capability for
Boolean searching that subscription databases do, SSRN does have a fairly
efficient system for matching users with products. Authors of articles
52 See Solum, supra note 12, at 851-53.
53See id. at 850 (hypothesizing that because law students are not experts in the breadth

and depth of legal literature, they "rely on 'proxy variables,' e.g. the institutional
affiliations of authors or their prior record of publication" when making publication
decisions).
54 See id. at 850-51 ("[A]nyone who has knocked around academia knows that there
is a
seamy underside to the world of peer review.").
55 See Joshua S. Gans & George B. Sheperd, How Are the Mighty Fallen: Rejected
Classic Articles by Leading Economists, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 165, 171 (1994) (chronicling
the rejection of now seminal articles, such as George Akerlofs Market for Lemons:
Quality, Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, which was rejected by economics
journals for four years before being published).
56 See id. at 169 (describing one of Gary Becker's works as being rejected and unread
due to the comments of one editor until it was published several years later, after other
interceding works had used the same methodology).
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prepare an abstract, which is searchable by users, and these same authors
can choose key words that also aid users in searching.
Authors in various disciplines and countries have uploaded over
one hundred thousand working papers and abstracts.5 7 In return, users of
SSRN downloaded approximately three million documents in 2005 from
the SSRN database. 58
This revolution in disintermediation greatly
improves scholars' ability to both disseminate and access works in "Internet
time." 59 The question remains whether SSRN and other repositories have
found a way to circumvent the reputational intermediary function that
seems to be necessary for other producers of goods. In a way, SSRN is
much like eBay; although individual authors could post papers on their own
websites for distribution, an aggregator with search capabilities makes it
easier for consumers to find and retrieve useful scholarship. Although
branded products resold on eBay rely on pre-existing demand networks,
most articles have a productive life with a very small demand curve.
Demand may be restricted to a small handful of researchers that rely not on
taste or style but on a specific need to access each original work. The cost
of making a mistake in researching and finding an irrelevant article is fairly
low to an academic researcher; she merely throws the article back without
finishing reading. Unlike consumers who have limited attention and
resources to spend obtaining a specific good, thorough academic
researchers are used to lengthy projects with many rabbit holes, and a few
minutes spent reading a non-useful abstract is no hardship. While a
consumer needs to find the one toaster that fits his needs, a researcher needs
to find all the scholarship on point and also to know where the boundaries
of that scholarship lie.
That being said, publishers and academic presses have not been
eliminated for the reputational intermediary functions that they serve in
authenticating certain works as worthy of their attention.
A paper
published in a top journal or top academic press will always have additional
value to the author for career purposes and possibly to casual researchers
who need to quickly access "seminal works" in a field without lengthy
research.

57See Bernard S. Black & Paul L. Caron, Ranking Law Schools: Using SSRNto

Measure Scholarly Performance,81 IND. L.J. 83, 95 (2006) (giving statistics as to data
and use).
51Id.at 96.
59See Legal Theory Blog,

http://lsolum.blogspot.com/archives/2006 01 01 isolum archive.html#113683990156
732487 (Jan. 9, 2006, 17:20 CST).

'0See Solum, supra note 12, at 861-62 (listing as one of the functions of publication
intermediaries that of "certification," which both "reduce[s] search costs" and
"enhances professional reputation").
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D. Not-So-Success Stories
Although businesses or individuals that harness technology to
subvert traditional hierarchies are few and notable, those who try and fail
are many and not as highly publicized. In a parallel universe in which the
Internet has made this revolution possible, new authors would sell directly
to readers, as would songwriters and recording artists, filmmakers,
inventors and fashion designers. Worthy political candidates could appeal
to the public without the need for political parties' fundraising machines.
The list could go on and on. However, this world does not exist in our
universe, and much of the reason lies in the necessity of reputational
intermediaries in our complex society with the unlimited choices it offers.
Some instances of individuals or groups who have actively
questioned and opposed reputational intermediaries know how dangerous
visibly avoiding intermediary hierarchies can be. These examples may
have more salience for the failure of online iPOs. For example, during
Google's online IPO, rumors existed that institutional investors were
boycotting the auction. The world outside the securities industry has other
examples. One such example occurred in the music industry.
At the 2006 Grammy Awards, a singing trio called the Dixie Chicks
won Record of the Year, Album of the Year, Country Album of the Year,
and Country Performance by a Duo or Group for their album Taking the
Long Way and the song Not Ready to Make Nice. However, songs from this
critically acclaimed album were not played on most radio stations. In
March 2003, the Dixie Chicks were one of the most popular recording
groups in the U.S. 6 1 Their first two albums had sold over 10 million copies
each, and their third album had sold more than 6 million copies in its first
nine months. 62 The first day of ticket sales for their U.S. tour was a
63
complete success, with over $49 million in tickets sold.
One of the songs
from that record, Travelin' Soldier, was the number one country song, and
another, a remake of Fleetwood Mac's Landslide, was a top ten pop song.64
However, on March 10, 2003, lead singer Natalie Maines,
originally from Lubbock, Texas, ad libbed from a stage in London that
"we're ashamed that the President of the United States is from Texas. ,65
61Ironically, in 2002, programming directors gave their third album, Home, airplay

even though one single bashed country radio, due to the vast appeal of the
unconventional group. See Bill Friskics-Warren, The Dixie Chicks Keep the Heat on
Nashville, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2002, at B1 (quoting a program director for Infinity
Broadcast Network as saying in 2002 "Do we have a choice not to play the Dixie
Chicks? Sure, we have a choice, but one also has a choice to cut off one's nose to spite
their face. The Dixie Chicks are the biggest of the big right now. We play their music
as often as we can get it on the air.").
62Chris Willman, Stars and Strife, ENTERTAINMENT WEEKLY, May 2, 2003, at 22.
63 id.
64

Id.

65

id.
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This statement referred to preparations by the U.S. to invade Iraq, a move
that occurred on March 20 that began the Iraq War, which is ongoing
almost five years later. This statement stopped the group's commercial
success in its tracks. Almost immediately, songs from their hit album were
pulled from radio playlists throughout the U.S. 6 6 and Travelin' Soldier
dropped 62 spots to number 63.6
The almost instant unpopularity of the group might be attributable
to mere backlash from irate listeners. However, the power of the radio
stations in creating and destroying demand for a particular song or group
cannot be ignored. The songs that are played on the radio are determined
by the program director, who is extensively lobbied by the record
companies that produce albums and choose singles. 6s The program director
determines what songs will be on the playlist (that the DJ may not deviate
from at most stations) and how many times that song will be played in a
week.69 These decisions may change as a song is added, depending on
listener requests and telephone research that asks listeners to listen to song
clips and tell which songs sound familiar.70 Obviously, if a song is put into
high rotation from the beginning, then more requests will follow and more
survey respondents will find the song familiar, feeding on the initial
determination by the program director. In the best case scenario, songs are
added to playlists weeks before the launch of the album, building up
demand. However, if a song is not added to many playlists and gets weak
rotation, then the debut of the album may go unnoticed. Program directors
can also pull songs from rotation, causing demand for the album to
dwindle,71 which is what happened to the Dixie Chicks' fourth album.
The ripple effects of alienating the conglomerates that own multiple
stations are pronounced: no air play, no promotion of tour dates, no
giveaways of concert tickets, no mention at all. When a documentary72

66 See Jennifer 8. Lee, Musicians ProtestingMonopoly in the Media, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.

18, 2003, at El (discussing the consolidation of radio stations under conglomerates such

as Clear Channel and noting that Cox Radio and Cumulus banned its member stations
from playing Dixie Chicks songs after Maines' statements).
67 See Jeff Leeds, Chicks Sing New Song? Who Needs Airplay?, N.Y.
TIMES, June 10,
2006, at B5.
68 See generally JACOB SLICHTER, SO YOU WANNA BE A ROCK & ROLL STAR (2004)
(chronicling the rise and fall of Semisonic and giving a detailed primer on the power of
radio stations, their program directors and the prevalence of legal and illegal "payola").
69 See id. at 82.
70 See id. at 86-87.
71See id. at 82. Writing of his own situation, Slichter says: "The right PD could 'break'
us, turning thousands of listeners on to us and thereby launching our album and career.
Or, even in the face of building momentum, an influential PD could kill our single by
dropping it from the station's playlist, sending our stock plummeting."
72 SHUT UP AND SING (Cabin Creek Films 2006).
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about the Dixie Chicks' 2003 experience was released, major
television
73
broadcasters would not carry paid advertisements for the film.
Even with the current power of the Internet, when the group
released their next album, in 2006, the group did not forego intermediaries
and simply sell their new album straight from their own website without a
record company. Instead, the Dixie Chicks and their producers sought out
new demand networks other than the ones commanded by country radio
stations. 74 Although some radio programming directors were willing to
hear the new album, the theme of the album, which focused on how unfairly
the band was treated by both the industry and listeners, actually inspired
more directors to keep the Dixie Chicks off their playlists. 75 Through new
marketing strategies, and with positive critical acclaim, the album was a
respectable hit, although its pre-Grammy Award sales of 1.9 million
copies 76 paled in comparison to their earlier albums and competing albums
whose songs were played on country radio.77 News of its Grammy success
immediately boosted sales to 103,000 the following week, seven times what
its anemic sales were the week before.78
Although one could expect that an established recording artist or
group with a pre-established fan base could avoid intermediaries and sell its
product directly to buyers, the necessity for a demand network appears to be
strong in the recording industry. In a cyberworld in which anyone can offer
music for sale, listeners tend to depend on established demand networks to
signal value to them. 79 Because of this tendency, initial decisions by

73See David M. Halbfinger, Negative Publicity is the New Hot Hype, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.

28, 2006, at B7.
74See Leeds, supra note 67 at B5 (describing how the 2006 album Taking the Long Way
was not played on radio stations but benefited in its first few weeks by a promotional
push on 60 Minutes and morning television shows, as well as partnering with Target).
75See id.
(quoting one sympathetic programmer as being frustrated that the new album
rehashed old wounds instead of moving on to less political themes).
76Bill O'Reilly, the conservative host of the Fox News show The O'Reilly Factor,
predicted on-air that the album would be a commercial failure and wouldn't sell more
than two million copies. See Jon Pareles, America Catches Up With Them, N.Y. TIMES,
May 21, 2006, at B1 (describing an incident where Maines reminded O'Reilly of this
statement after O'Reilly told her that he liked the first single, Not Ready to Make Nice).
77See Jeff Leeds, Grammy Sweep by Dixie Chicks is Seen as Vindication, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 13, 2007, at El.
78See Ben Sisario, Pop Charts: Lovers and Grammys, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22,
2007, at
E2.
79See Duncan J. Watts, Is Justin Timberlake a Product of Cumulative Advantage?, N.Y.
TIMES, April 15, 2007, at 22 ("[P]eople almost never make decisions independently in part because the world abounds with so many choices that we have little hope of ever
finding what we want on our own; in part because we are never really sure what we
want anyway; and in part because what we often want is not so much to experience the
'best' of everything as it is to experience the same things as other people and thereby
also experience the benefits of sharing.").
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become powerful determinants of what music

DISINTERMEDIATION AND INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS

Much like other industries, the initial public offering industry in the
U.S. in the late 1990s seemed ripe for a technological revolution. Issuers
wanting to sell shares of their companies into the market must interact with
many intermediaries along the way, including investment banks,
accountants, lawyers, and printers.81 Each of these intermediaries requires
a fee, thus decreasing the net amount of capital that an issuer can yield from
a public offering. Some of these intermediaries are required by law and
cannot be bypassed entirely, such as accountants and lawyers. However,
advances in the Internet have made it possible to bypass traditional
investment banks.
These banks launch public offerings using the
bookbuilding method, a very expensive method for issuers. After the end
of the technology boom in 2001, the bookbuilding process became
scrutinized for the conflicts of interest between underwriters, analysts and
brokers employed by the investment banks and the issuers that were their
clients. 82 These conflicts, which seemed to be inherent in the bookbuilding
process, increased the costs for issuers and reduced the amount of capital
8 3
they could raise.
80 See id. (describing a study in which more than 14,000 listeners were asked to rate
unfamiliar songs and were given the option of downloading their favorites, and one set
of participants was able to see the download rate of the songs before deciding. The
authors of the study found that songs that became popular were different among the
groups, and in the groups that were able to see the downloads, the difference between
the popular songs and the unpopular grew steadily as the study continued.).
81See CARL W. SCHNEIDER, JOSEPH M. MANKO & ROBERT S. KANT, GOING PUBLIC:
PRACTICE, PROCEDURE, AND CONSEQUENCES (1997) (listing legal fees, accounting fees,
and printing costs as the three largest costs of iPOs after the underwriting fee).
82 In 2003, the SEC settled with ten major investment banks in a
lawsuit primarily
regarding analysts touting the stock of issuers who were clients of the analysts' own
investment banks. See Press Release, SEC, Ten of Nation's Top Investment Firms
Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and
Investment Banking (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/200354.htm. In the complaint, both Credit Suisse First Boston and Salomon Smith Barney
were charged with spinning IPO shares in "hot" IPO offerings. See SEC v. Credit
Suisse First Boston, LLC, Litigation Release No. 18110, 2003 SEC LEXIS 1010 (Apr.
28, 2003); SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., Litigation Release No. 18111, 2003
SEC LEXIS 1009 (Apr. 28, 2003). In the global settlement of these claims, CSFB and
Salomon neither admitted nor denied these claims.
83 In

2002, Harvey Pitt, the now former SEC Chairman, asked Dick Grasso, then New

York Stock Exchange Chairman, and Robert R. Glauber, then NASD Chairman, to
convene a committee of leaders in both the business and academic communities to
assess problems in the IPO process. In May 2003, the NYSE/NASD IPO Advisory
Committee released a document entitled "Report and Recommendations," which
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Just as the Internet created many opportunities to democratize other
processes, such as the election process, the corporate director nominating
process, the purchasing of goods, and the acquisition of information, it had
great potential to democratize and streamline the IPO process. If the
promise of the Internet were fulfilled, the IPO revolution would mean the
obsolescence of the bookbuilding mechanism and the emergence of the IPO
auction, a transparent and accessible system open to the participation of all
U.S. investors. However, this revolution did not happen; although the
Internet held the technical capabilities of avoiding traditional Wall Street
intermediaries, it could not duplicate the necessary demand network of
brokers, analysts and institutional investors those intermediaries controlled.
A. Bookbuilding Method

In an IPO, the issuing company sells its shares at the offering price.
If the offering price increases in the first day, even dramatically, the issuer
does not profit from any share price increase. The resellers of shares either
allocated prior to the offering or bought early in the offering capture this
price increase. However, some company insiders who sell shares in the
aftermarket may be able to sell at the higher price, depending on any
restrictions placed on them by the issuer or underwriter to hold their shares
for a certain amount of time. Primarily, persons that are able to buy IPO
shares at the original offering price will capitalize on the spread between the
offering price and the market price. In almost all IPOs conducted in the
U.S. using the bookbuilding method, the vast majority, almost 80%, of4
original IPO shares are pre-allocated by the underwriters of the offering.
The recipients of those shares are usually institutional investors known to
the underwriters and regular customers of the underwriters.8 5 As a

acknowledged some problems with the bookbuilding process but nevertheless
concluded that the method should not be eliminated or disfavored but should compete
on equal footing with online auctions). See NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMMITTEE,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF A COMMITTEE CONVENED BY THE NEW YORK

NASD AT THE REQUEST OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 9 (May 2003) [hereinafter IPO ADVISORY COMM. REPORT],
available at
http://wiivwfinra.orglweblgroupslrules regsldocumentslrules regs/p010373.pdf.
84 See Beatrice Boehmer et al., Do Institutions Receive FavorableAllocations
in IPOs
with Better Long-Run Returns?, 41 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANAL. 809, 814 (2006)
(studying a sample of IPOs and determining that 79% of all original IPO shares in the
STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. AND

sample were allocated by the underwriter).
85 See Reena Aggarwal et al., InstitutionalAllocation in Initial Public Qfferings:
EmpiricalEvidence, 57 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANAL. 1421, 1422 (2002) (finding that

institutional investors receive approximately 75% of original IPO shares in an average

offering).
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consequence of the institutional investor and "friends and family
allocations, no more than 20% of an offering will be available for sale at the
opening of trading. Those retail investors interested in investing in a new
issuer must buy shares from original recipients at a higher price in the
aftermarket. Generally, institutional investors are the recipients of IPO
shares at the offering price, and later sell their shares within days to retail
investors at a higher price, pocketing the difference. 87 In this method, the
result is either that the issuer receives less than the full value of its shares,
the retail investor overpays for its shares, or a combination of the two.
The unwarranted costs of the investment bank intermediary are
almost entirely due to the bookbuilding method. 88 The bookbuilding
method gives the lead underwriter full control of the IPO offering. The
underwriter controls how the offering is marketed, how the offering is
priced, who receives the IPO shares, and when share recipients may sell
their shares in the secondary market. Additionally, the underwriter solicits
"indications of interest" 8 9 from investors during road shows that take place
after the company has filed its registration statement, but before the SEC
has declared the statement "effective." Not surprisingly, the only investors
invited to road shows are large, institutional investors and extremely
wealthy individuals. 90 Based on the indications of interest received at the
road shows, the underwriter sets the price for the original IPO shares,
determines which road show attendees will receive shares at the original
IPO price, and determines the number of shares each attendee will receive.
Although the bookbuilding method seems designed to assist
underwriters in determining the market price of the shares, thus capturing
market demand in the highest price at which the issuer may sell the original
In an IPO, the issuer may receive an allocation from the underwriter that may be sold
to employees, relatives, friends and business partners. See Renee Deger, 1PO Directed
86

Share Plans Pose Risks, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 13, 1999, at B5 (describing how before the
1999-2000 Boom, directed share plans generally accounted for 10% or less of the total

offering but grew during this time period).
87 See

Alexander P. Ljungqvist et al., Hot Markets, Investor Sentiment, and 1PO Pricing

33, Nov. 6, 2003, http://ssrn.com/abstract-282293 (stating that 92% of shares sold by
institutional investors on the first day of trading are bought by retail investors).
88 See Shawn Tully, System Failure;CorporateAmerica Has Lost Its Way. Here's a
Road Map for Restoring Confidence, FORTUNE, June 24, 2002, at 74 (reporting that due
to investment banking fees and underpricing, startups paid 58 cents for every dollar
raised in a public offering and stating that "[t]he main source of corruption in America's
financial markets is the sordid, antiquated world of initial public offerings").
89 See Francesca Cornelli & David Goldreich, Bookbuilding & Strategic Allocation,
56
J. FIN. 2337, 2337 (2001).
90See Adam Lashinsky, ft's Time to Open Up the Road Show: What the SEC Doesn't
Want You to Know, FORTUNE, Nov. 8, 1999, at 338; The Regulation of Securities
Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 7606A, Exchange Act Release No. 40, 632A,
Investment Company Act Release No. 23,519A, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,174,67,214 (proposed
Dec. 4, 1998) (acknowledging that investment banks generally invite only selected
broker-dealers and large investors to road shows).
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IPO shares, in practice the resulting price is systematically less than market
demand. During the first day of trading in an IPO, most issuers see their
shares increase in price throughout the day, reflecting the fact that the
offering price was less than the market price. From 1980-2001, the average
IPO share price increased during the first day by 18.8%.91 This first-day
"pop" will also be pronounced during "hot" IPO markets, 92 such as the
market that existed during the technology boom, specifically in 1999 and
the first half of 2000. During this period, the average first-day increase was
65%. 93 Technology issuers had even more dramatic first-day share price
increases, with one-third of those issuers seeing the share price double in
the first day. 94 Even in lethargic market environments, the investment bank
that determines an offering price seems to fix that price at a substantial
discount from the price the market will bear. Although many scholars have
developed economic hypotheses of why IPO shares are underpriced,9 5 an
agency cost hypothesis explains in the simplest terms why an underwriter
would underprice IPO shares. In doing so, the underwriter rewards loyal
customers, including institutional investors and investment banking clients,
by allocating them shares with a built-in gain. This reward, though given
by the underwriter,
is financed by the issuer, who may not benefit from this
96
practice.
The bookbuilding process, complete with the underpricing and preallocation of shares, does not run afoul of any state or federal laws,
including securities laws and rules of the National Association of Securities
Dealers. In recent years, however, some regulators have attempted to
investigate the most extreme abuses. For example, a few powerful Wall
Street investment banks were investigated and charged by the SEC, the
Department of Justice and the New York Attorney General for allocating

91

Jay R. Ritter & lvo Welch, A Review oflPO Activity, Pricing,and Allocations, 57 J.

FIN. 1795, 1795 (2002).

92 Francois Derrien & Kent L. Womack, Auctions vs. Bookbuilding and the Control of
Underpricingin Hot 1PO Markets, 16 REV. FIN. STUD. 31, 44 (2003).
93See Ritter & Welch, supra note 91, at 1796.
94 Melanie Warner, Friendsand Family: Sycamore Gave Lots of "DirectedShares" to a
Key Customer, FORTUNE, Mar. 20, 2000, at 104.
95 Ann E. Sherman & Sheridan Titman, Building the 1PO Order Book: Underpricing&
ParticipationLimits With Costly Information,65 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 4 (2001) (arguing that
underpricing is necessary to compensate investors who disclose their valuation of the
firm pre-IPO and assist the underwriter in assessing market value); Janet Cooper
Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of Why InitialPublic Qfferings are

Underpriced,41 UCLA L. REV. 17, 19 (1993) (arguing that because damages in
securities lawsuits based on disclosure fraud are based on price declines from the

offering price, underwriters are inclined to set the offering price artificially low).
96 See

John C. Coffee, Jr., The IPO Allocation Probe: Who is the Victim?, N.Y.L.J., Jan.
18, 2001, at 5 (describing as dysfunctional an IPO system that sees up to 75 % of the
market value of the IPO shares going to either underwriters or institutional investors
and not the issuer).
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shares to investors in return for excessive brokerage fees. 97 In addition, the
SEC has shown some willingness to prosecute "laddering schemes"
whereby underwriter require allocates of hot IPO shares to buy more shares
in the aftermarket of either the same issuer or a different issuer. 98 Private
lawsuits by investors alleging that the bookbuilding method is similar to a
"pump-and-dump" scheme have not been as successful under either
antitrust laws 99 or securities laws."' 0 In 2002, the NASD proposed Rule
2712, which would prohibit investment bankers from allocating IPO shares

97See Press Release, SEC,, supra note 82. In addition, The NASD announced in May
2004 that ithad fined Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., Morgan Stanley & Co. and others for
churning excessive fees on the day of the IPO for the accounts of allocates. See NASD
News Release, NASD Charges Invemed Associates with Sharing inCustomers' Profits
from Hot IPOs (Apr. 15, 2003), available at
http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?ldcService-SS GET PAGE&ssDocName=NASDW
002942; see also NASD News Release, Thomas Weisel Partners to Pay $1.75 Million
to Settle NASD Charges of IPO, E-Mail Retention Violations (Mar. 30, 2005),
http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?ldcService=SS GET PAGE&ssDocName=NASDW
_013698 (determining that Thomas Weisel partners received excessively high
commissions ($1 per share compared to the normal six cents per share) on highly liquid
trades within 24 hours of allocating hot IPO shares to the same customers during 19992000). For example, a customer may be granted an opportunity to buy hot IPO shares
on a certain day, but during that day, the broker will buy and sell a liquid security for
the same customer and charge a fee of$100,000 instead of a $3000 fee.
98SEC v.JP.Morgan Securities Inc., No. 03-2028 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2003) (entering
settlement agreement for $25 million for requiring customers receiving IPO allocations
in an oversubscribed "hot" IPO, IPIX, to participate in a "cold" IPO for Biopure in
violation of Rule 101 (Regulation M) of the 1933 Act, NASD Rule 2110, and the FreeRiding and Withholding Interpretation).
99Billing v.Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that
litigation under antitrust laws could continue in case in which "[p]laintiffs allege an epic
Wall Street conspiracy ....
Through these contracts and by other illegal means, the
underwriter firms allegedly executed a series of manipulations that grossly inflated the
price of the securities after the IPOs in the so-called aftermarket."). This decision was
reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court on procedural grounds, ending the litigation.
Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S.Ct. 2383, 2397 (2007) (holding that the
antitrust laws do not apply to these actions, which are allowed by the federal securities
laws, and that the SEC is a better governmental agent to monitor these types of
activities than the federal courts applying antitrust law).
100Similar cases under securities laws have also generally been unsuccessful. Although
the district court initially held that the laddering and market manipulation allegations
against investment banks in six of over 300 consolidated cases could stand and certified
the plaintiff class, the Second Circuit reversed that finding. In re Initial Public Offering
Sec. Litig., 227 F.R.D. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev'd by 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006).
Likewise, a group of these 300 cases alleging price inflation via underpricing was
dismissed by both the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York and the
Second Circuit. Tenney v. CreditSuisse FirstBoston Corp., 2006 WL 1423785 (2d Cir.
May 19, 2006), cert. denied Liu v.Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 127 S.Ct. 733
(2006).
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to executives of clients or potential clients in a quid pro quo transaction.101
However, proposed Rule 2712 was still pending as of July 2007, although
public comments were closed
in January 2005, indicating that the Rule is
102
accepted.
be
to
unlikely
B. OpenIPO

Alternatively, IPO shares could be distributed through an open
auction process conducted over the Internet. In an Internet auction, bidders
place orders based on the number of shares that they would purchase at
given prices. The highest price at which all shares would be purchased
becomes the offering price. Successful bidders are allocated shares based
on the offering price, and if the offering is oversubscribed at the offering
price, then bidders receive a pro rata allocation of shares. No shares would
be pre-allocated to either individuals or institutions. In this process, the
underwriter is more of a facilitator, like eBay, than an intermediary. The
underwriter has no discretion or very little discretion in determining the
price of the IPO shares or the recipients of the distribution in the purest
form of an online auction. Because the resulting offering price should
reflect the full market demand for the IPO shares (100% of X), the online
auction process should eliminate underpricing and allow the issuer to obtain
the maximum amount of capital to be raised in the offering.
Although several investment banks developed online auction
systems during the late 1990s, currently only W.R. Hambrecht + Co.
maintains an online IPO auction platform.10 3
Beginning in 1999,
Hambrecht began launching companies using an online IPO auction process
called OpenIPO. Although the completed OpenIPO auctions suggest that
the auction offering prices do more closely resemble the market prices for

101
See National Association of Securities Dealers, Notice to Members 02-55 (Aug. 22)
(requesting comment on Proposed New Rule 2712 (IPO Allocations and Distributions)).

This proposed rule was amended in September 2003 and in November 2003 to
incorporate some of the recommendations of the IPO Advisory Committee and
comments were solicited on "requiring underwriters to... [u]se an auction or other
system to collect indications of interest to help establish the final IPO price"). See
National Association of Securities Dealers, Notice to Members 03-72, 778-79 (Nov.
2003).
102In 1998, the SEC proposed rule 7606A, which would have made numerous changes
to the IPO process. Dubbed the "Aircraft Carrier" proposal for its breadth, rule 7606A
languished for years without being accepted.
103 Hambrecht + Co. was launched in 1998 by Bill Hambrecht, a former
investment
banker at his own San Francisco firm, Hambrecht & Quist. See Christian Berthelsen,
Investment Banker Fights the System: Plan for Cutting IPO Conflicts Gets Attention,
but Wall Street Dubious, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 22, 2002, at GI (describing OpeniPO as
"an alternative open-bidding process modeled on Dutch flower auctions to eliminate
secretive IPO pricing strategies and what many experts consider allocation favoritism").
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the shares, as reflected in the closing prices for the first day of trading, very
few companies have opted for the online auction route.
Issuer Name
NetSuite Inc.
Clean
Energy
Fuels Corp.
Interactive
Brokers Group,
Inc.
FortuNet, Inc.
Traffic.com, Inc.
Dover Saddlery,
Inc.
Avalon
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.
CryoCor, Inc.
Morningstar,
Inc.
Boll
Holding,
Inc.
Google, Inc.10 7
New
River
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.
Genitope
Corporation
RedEnvelope,
Inc.
Overstock.com
104

Date
of
IPO
12/20/2007
5/25/2007

Size
of
Offering
$161,200,000
$120,000,000

Offering
Price
$26.00
$12.00

Closing
Price
$35.50
$12.04

Percent
Change
0.3654
0.333

5/4/2007

$1,200,400,000

$30.01

$31.30

4.298

1/31/2006
1/25/2006
11/17/2005

$22,500,000
$78,600,000
$27, 500,000

$9.00
$12.00
$10.00

$9.05
$12.01 104
$10.25105

0.555
0.083
2.500

9/28/2005

$28,875,000

$10.50

$9.49

-9.619

7/14/2005
5/2/2005

$40,799,990
$140,831,250

$11.00
$18.50

$10.87
$20.05 106

-1.181
8.378

3/15/2005

$35,100,001

$11.50

$11.50

0.000

8/18/2004
8/5/2004

$1,666,429,400
$33,600,000

$85.00
$8.00

$100.34
$7.50

18.047
-6.250

10/30/2003

$33,300,000

$9.00

$10.00

-11.111

9/25/2003

$30,800,000

$14.00

$14.55

3.928

5/29/2002

$39,000,000

$13.00

$13.03

0.231

According to the Wall Street Journal's market company research tool on its website,

closing prices for this stock were only available for January 27, 2006 and later, even
though its initial public offering is listed as occurring on January 25, 2006.
1o5 According to the Wall Street Journal's market company research
tool on its website,
closing prices for this stock were only available for November 18, 2005 and later, even
though its initial public offering is listed as occurring on November 17, 2005.
106 According to the Wall Street Journal's market company research tool
on its website,
closing prices for this stock were only available for May 3, 2005 and later, even though
its initial public offering is listed as occurring on May 2, 2005.
107 Technically, Google was not an OpenIPO because it was not hosted on
Hambrecht's
IPO platform and was executed according to its own guidelines. However, because so
many people associate the Google IPO with the Hambrecht IPO system, it is included
here.
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Briazz, Inc.
Peet's Coffee &
Tea
Nogatech, Inc.
Andover.net
Salon.com
Ravenswood

5/2/2001
1/25/2001

$16,000,000
$26,400,000

$8.00
$8.00

$8.03
$9.38

0.375
17.250

5/17/2000
12/8/1999
6/22/1999
4/9/1999

$42,000,000
$82,800,000
$27,300,000
$11,550,000

$12.00
$18.00
$10.50
$10.50

$9.41
$63.38
$10.00
$10.88

-21.583
252.111
-5.000
3.600

As the table suggests, only a handful of companies have chosen the
online auction for their IPOs. Roughly no more than two companies choose
this option a year, with 1999, the height of the technology boom, seeing
three online IPOs and 2005, the year following Google's online auction,
seeing five. However, the online auction does appear to capture full market
demand in the offering price much better than the bookbuilding system.
Out of the twenty-one companies that have chosen this option, only four
companies have seen first-day share price increases of over 10%, and only
two companies' shares increased over the average bookbuilding price
increase of 18.8%. Including Andover.net's nonrepresentative jump of over
252% in its first day of trading, the mean first-day return is skewed to
13.960%, an increase that does not seem substantially more efficient than
the traditional bookbuilding increase. Because the dataset contains an
outlier, and the mean is not robust to the outlier, the median first-day
increase is a better measure. In fact, the median first-day return using the
OpenIPO system is 0.375%, which comes close to approximating the
theoretically perfect first-day pop of zero. In the median case, the issuer
would capture 99.625% of the market price X.
If online auction IPOs are more efficient in getting necessary
capital to issuers, then proponents of auctions must explain why they seem
to be unpopular with issuers. Many reasons that may affect decisionmaking on the margins come to mind: some issuers may believe that going
public with a Wall Street firm has more cachet than an auction;1° 8 some
issuers may believe that a first-day pop creates positive media buzz that
either advertises their products and services 10 9 or increases goodwill for a
follow-on offering;" 0 some issuers may themselves benefit from the
bookbuilding method by receiving allocations of original IPO shares in

108See

Tully, supra note 88, at 74 (positing that issuers choose the inefficient

bookbuilding method because "gilded names like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley

provide a comfort factor").
'09
Griffith, supra note 5, at 601 ("A substantial pop on the first day of trading may be
valuable for its ability to signal to other market participants that the issuer is a quality
company.").
110 Id. at 601 ("Aftermarket performance may also have an impact on future equity
offerings in which issuers may recoup the capital foregone in initial underpricing.").
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future offerings;"' and some issuers may use pre-IPO allocations to their
own advantage by granting allocations to business partners, vendors,
employees and friends. 112
However, one explanation holds true in all cases: in the U.S.,
online IPOs that avoid Wall Street intermediaries also suffer from the loss
of demand networks that those intermediaries create. 113 Just as brilliant
novels and inspiring music can be sold directly to consumers over the
Internet, these products will not be sold to a substantial number of
consumers without being part of a demand network (or having amazing
luck).
C. The Wall Street Demand Network
Investors have a dazzling array of choices when it comes to
purchasing equity securities in publicly-traded companies. Almost 7,000
companies are traded on the New York Stock Exchange, the NASDAQ, and
the American Stock Exchange. This number does not include companies
traded on foreign exchanges or companies publicly traded but not on
exchanges. And of course, investors may also choose to invest in bonds,
111
See John C. Coffee, Jr.,
"Spinning"for Dollars: 1POs and Allocation of Hot Issues,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 26, 1998, at 5 (describing a hypothetical scenario in which founders are
inclined to protest because the share price jumped the first day but are placated both by
their newly created personal wealth and by receiving IPO shares of another client of the
investment banker); see also Tully, supra note 88, at 74 (suggesting that "the SEC
should ban all officers of startups and their venture capitalists from accepting any other
firm's IPO shares from investment banks within a year of their own company's filing to
go public").
112See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Sweetheart Stock Deals Common
in Telecom, TULSA
WORLD, Sept. 1, 2002, at E1 (describing transaction in which ONI Systems Corp.
offered two executives for Williams Communications pre-iPO shares for $6.32 each a
few months prior to the announcement that Williams and ONI had signed a $30 million
contract for ONI's fiber optic network-related products; at the time of the IPO, one
Williams executive's gain was $43 million); Jeff Smith, N.Y.Puts Heat on ATacchio Hot
1POs, ROCKY MTN.NEWS, June 21, 2003, at IC (detailing another ONI transaction that
rewarded Joe Nacchio, former Qwest CEO, with friends and family shares that tripled
in price the first day of trading three months before the announcement of a contract
between ONI and Qwest that caused the shares to soar 15 percent).
113See Tully, supra note 88, at 74 (noting that one critical reason that issuers choose the
inefficient bookbuilding method is because "going with a top house guarantees that a
prestigious analyst will tout your stock [to] powerful institutions"). Although issuers
that use pre-IPO stock to gain business advantages may not be subject to liability, the
executives receiving the shares who subsequently steer business the issuer's way may
be. See Kathleen Pender, Be Cautious When Business Associates Offer Access to 1PO
Shares, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 7, 2000, at B1 (considering a scenario whereby the business
associate recipient of the directed shares might be charged with commercial bribery
under California state law for accepting something of value "in return for using or
agreeing to use his or her position for the benefit of that other person"); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 641.3 (West 2007).
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various types of funds and other investment vehicles. Even if an investor
wanted to concentrate on companies launching IPOs, that research would be
daunting. In 2006, 198 companies went public in the U.S. alone. 114 In hot
markets, this number may double; in 1999, 486 companies went public, and
in 2000, 406."5 In addition, an investor would have to spend more time
researching each company than, for example, researching a book by reading
the book jacket or a review or researching an album by listening to snippets
in a record store. Most retail investors, therefore, rely on third-parties to
tell them the value of an upcoming IPO.
When an IPO is being considered, an issuer would like to see
positive reviews in financial newspapers and magazines and on financial
news television shows.
In addition, analysts, some of whom are
independent and some of whom are employed by investment banks,
research IPOs and then issue recommendations on whether investors should
invest in a particular company's shares. Hopefully, this coverage will last
throughout the IPO and into the aftermarket, supporting the price for
months to come. In addition, brokers, who either read the research
themselves or hear about IPOs directly, will recommend the IPOs to their
customers, particularly institutional investors.
In a bookbuilding IPO, the demand network is highly structured
and led by the underwriter. However, if an issuer decides to avoid
traditional underwriters and launch its shares in an online IPO, then the
issuer must hope that financial reporters and analysts will be willing to
provide coverage of their IPO and that brokers will recommend the IPO to
their customers independent of the underwriter's efforts.11 6 However, these
actors may not have sufficient incentives to act in that way. In addition,
traditional underwriters work in syndicates, thereby expanding existing
demand networks by a factor of the number of participating banks.
However, few traditional underwriters have chosen to join Hambrecht in
online IPOs. 117 Therefore, although online auction IPOs may be efficient in
that they capture existing market demand (X) and completely incorporate it
into the offering price, the online auction IPO does not in and of itself

114See

Renaissance Capital's 2006 Annual IPO Review, supra note 7.

115id.

116See

Berthelsen, supra note 103, at Gi (reporting that when Overstock.com went

public in 2002 using OpenIPO, "nearly every firm competing for the underwriting
business said top investment houses would not provide research coverage of his
company"). In fact, only one company other than Hambrecht provided research
coverage for Overstock.com, even three months after the IPO. See id
"7

See PatrickByrne, CEO of Overstock.corn, IPO Reporter, available at 2002 WLNR

5011975 (Westlaw) (quoting Byrne as saying that when he was considering an auction
IPO, "[A]ll the other banks told me they would not work with Hambrecht. They all let
me know they would all work with each other, but none of them would work with
Hambrecht.").
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create increased demand (X + Y). Thus, issuers may be capturing close to
100% of X, but that amount may be less than 80% of (X + Y). 18
OpeniPO works somewhat like eBay, so there must be potential for
it to become as popular as eBay, even without functioning as either a
reputational intermediary1 19 or a demand intermediary. However, the
products on eBay are generally branded products that are being resold into a
market with sufficient demand for those items. In fact, one could argue that
many of the items on eBay are pre-selected by the sellers for sale based
entirely on the fact that market demand for those items is high. Resellers of
video game systems on eBay benefit from continued advertising and
marketing of those systems by the manufacturers and other retail outlets.
Amazon.com benefits from marketing of books by publishers and CDs by
record companies. But the issuers that are going public on OpenIPO are
selling a product that is fairly unknown and for which information is hard to
obtain and difficult to analyze. Particularly for unseasoned issuers with
short records of earnings, the OpenIPO method may capture existing market
demand in an efficient manner, but it won't generate increased demand the
way the bookbuilding method can with its built-in demand network.
Interestingly, one wonders if a seasoned issuer, with at least long-standing
demand for its products or services, if not its equity, could use OpeniPO
like eBay to sell at a higher price without losing capital to the
intermediaries.
D. Google
Unlike many technology firms that have launched IPOs in recent
years without lengthy track records, Google's two founders, Larry Page and
Sergey Brin, announced Google's IPO in 2004 after enjoying enormous
popularity for many years. 120 By design or sheer luck, Google did not go
118 While this article was in the editing process, NetSuite Inc. when public using
Hambrecht's auction platform, but with Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC as lead
manager of the offering, although the timing of this offering does not allow for a
thorough treatment in this article, the higher-than-expected closing price of $26 lends
some credibility to the argument that Wall Street underwriters increase demand.
However, the above-average first-day pop (36.538%) suggests that underpricing may
have occurred also. See Ken Schachter, NetSuite 1PO Hits Larry Ellison's Sweet Spot,
RED HERRING, Dec. 20, 2007, http://www.redherring.com/home/23345 (last visited Jan.
30, 2008); Lynn Cowan, NetSuite's IPO isan Ellison Winner, WALL ST.J., Dec. 21,

2007, at C3.
''9 Of course, one cannot say that Hambrecht + Co. does not act as a reputational
intermediary; under securities laws, it is liable to investors under certain circumstances
and as such has more at stake than eBay. However, Hambrecht + Co. does not provide
the types of services that a demand intermediary like a Wall Street investment bank
would with its network of analysts and brokers.
120
See Google's Dutch Treat, supra note 3, at A20 ("In a sense, this auction is the

perfect IPO expression of Google's own business model. The company's success has
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public during the 1999-2000 boom, although many technology companies
with little or no record of earnings did choose to go public during that time,
only to eventually fail. In fact, several search engine companies failed
during this time or underwent massive restructuring. 12 1 However, Google
remained private and continued to prosper, choosing to go public when it
was the most pre-eminent search engine website and the fifth most popular
website in the world.1 2 2
To make this high-profile IPO even more
interesting, the founders announced that the public offering would be
executed via an online auction that would
embody both the innovative
123
Google.
of
spirit
democratic
and
mindset
Google attempted to have the best of both IPO worlds: the Wall
Street demand network plus the less costly online IPO. Although Google
chose two traditional underwriters, Morgan Stanley and Credit Suisse First
Boston, to lead the ipO,124 Google chose the online IPO format. Neither
Morgan Stanley nor CSFB had ever offered an online IPO auction before.
This hybrid model could be similar to having an established publisher offer
an author's book electronically:
using an established network without
losing profits through unnecessary markups. In theory, Google would be
able to capture something closer to 100% of X than a traditional
bookbuilding auction.
In fact, using two established
demand

derived from its ability to democratize access to information via the Internet, and its
auction will likewise open its shares to a wide spectrum of investors.").
121 Lycos was sold twice, once in 2000 to Terra Networks, S.A., and again in 2004 to
Daum Communications Corporation. Jung-A Song, Saturation Drives Daum to Buy
Lycos: Acquisition UnderlinesAmbitions of South Korean Internet Companies, FIN.
TIMES (London), Aug. 3, 2004, at 23. AltaVista's parent was bought by Compaq,
which spun off AltaVista stock in 1999. CMGJ Files to Spin QffAltavista, TIMES OF
INDIA, Dec. 19, 1999. Altavista was eventually bought by Overture Services, Inc.,
which was then bought by Yahoo in 2003. Michael Bazeley, The Search Engine That
Could, Yahoo's Crash Efforts to Build an Internet Search Engine PaidOff Handsomely
for a Firm Lagging Behind Its Top Competitors. Now, Search Engine Ad Revenue is
Nearly Half of Yahoo's Total Net Revenue, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 10, 2005, at
IC.
122Stating that Google chose to go public may be misleading. Because the founders had
used Google shares to recruit talented employees, the firm found itself with over 300
shareholders, subjecting it to disclosure requirements of public companies under federal
securities laws. See Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The BrandingEffect of
Corporate Deal Structures, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1581, 1592 (2006) (describing how
Google would soon become a "backdoor" public company regardless of whether it
participated in an IPO). Google management surely realized that the firm might as well
reap the benefits of being a public company, including liquidity, increased capital and a
ready currency for conducting acquisitions.
123 Google's Dutch Treat, WALL ST. J., supra note 3.
124 Google Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-l), at 96 (Apr. 29, 2004) [hereinafter
Form S-1], available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504073639/dsl.htm.
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intermediaries, Google might be able to obtain the improbable, if not
impossible, 100% of (X + Y). "'
However, this model soon began to suffer. Critics noted that the
two underwriters were frustrating the democratic auction model by
requiring bidders to have accounts at their firms with very high minimum
balances.1 26 In its first amendment to its registration statement, Google
added twenty-nine additional banks as underwriters, including smaller
banks and online banks, with minimum balances as low as $2000, such as
E*Trade. 27
The twenty-nine additional underwriters also included
traditional Wall Street firms such as Merrill Lynch and Goldman Sachs,
who were in the unfamiliar position of being part of a large syndicate
without having leadership roles.12 Merrill Lynch would eventually drop
29
out of the syndicate. 1
In addition, although Hambrecht was added to the syndicate,
Google did not use the OpenIPO platform. Instead, it created a two-stage
bidding process13 that investors found confusing.' 3 1 On the day the
125However, one other theory suggests that the Google founders chose the auction

mechanism not to maximize IPO returns but to create a marketing event. See Fleischer,
supra note 121, at 1593 (arguing that because Google was prompted to go public by
noneconomic events its main goal was not to obtain an increased share price, either
100% of X or 100% of(X + Y), but to use its IPO as a branding event that reflected its
mantra, "Don't be Evil").
126See Form S-I, supra note 123, at 26 (noting that "due to each underwriter's
requirements... you may not be able to open an account"); see also John E. Fitzgibbon,
Jr., PassingParade: Google Hype vs. History, at
http://www. I 23jump.com/story/Passing-Parade:-Google-HypeVs.History/14842/ipo/Google (last visited Nov. 27, 2005) (reporting the rumor that one
of the two firms required a balance of $1 million in order to participate in the auction).
127Google Inc., Amendment No. I to Registration Statement (Form S-I), at 25 (May 21,
2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504093053/ds I a.htm.
128
See id at 94 (noting that Morgan Stanley and Credit Suisse would act as
representatives for the other underwriters).
129See Bill Deener, Google 1PO May Not Live Up to Its Hype, DALLAS MORNING

NEWS, Aug. 8, 2004, at ID (hypothesizing that Google's demand to reduce
underwriting fees from seven percent to three percent drove Merrill Lynch out of the
underwriting syndicate).
130This elaborate process is described in Google's seventh amendment to its registration
statement. See Google Inc., Amendment No. 7 to Registration Statement (Form S-I) at
35-38 (Aug. 13, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504139655/ds I a.htm.
First, bidders were required to register on a Google website to participate in the auction
and then separately open an account with a participating underwriter. Then, once the
bidding process started, bidders could submit bids to any of the remaining twenty-eight
underwriters listed in the seventh amendment via Internet, telephone, fax or hand
delivery. However, all bidders must accept electronic delivery of all notices during the
auction process. Bidders could change or withdraw bids during the auction process, but
Google management retained the right to change the amount of shares sold and the
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auction closed, Google also lowered the estimated price range from $108135 to $85-95. 32 After the auction closed, Google priced the shares at $85
per share. Because Google reserved the right to deviate from the clearing
price, no one outside the process could know if the clearing price was in
fact $85 or if the clearing price was above or below that amount. 133 In
addition, shares were allocated following a rather opaque process. Google
had reserved the right to allocate its shares either in a pro rata allocation or
in a "maximum share allocation" based on an algorithm that seemed to
indicate that smaller bids would be wholly accepted while larger bids would
receive a reduced number of shares. 134 Although Google did not make the
bids public, most critics believe that winning bidders received a 75%
allocation.1 35 Therefore, the offering would have been oversubscribed at
$85, suggesting that the clearing price was higher and that Google
underpriced itself To that end, the first-day increase in Google's share
price was 18%, roughly equivalent to the average bookbuilding IPO firstday increase. Therefore, the question remains: Was the Google IPO more
efficient than a traditional bookbuilding IPO? Google did not capture 100%
of the existing market demand on the day of its IPO. But, did Google
capture 82% of X, 82% of(X+Y) or 82% of something else?
Many critics believe that the market demand on August 18, 2004
was not as high as it otherwise could have been. Many factors unrelated to
the auction process contributed to investor confusion surrounding the
Google IPO: the uncertainty in the Internet search market in the summer of
2004,136 disclosures made by Google shortly before the registration

price range during the process. After an offering price was determined, successful
bidders would be sent an electronic notice, with one hour to withdraw their bid before
acceptance.
131See Pete Barlas, Many Thumbs Neither Up Nor Down for Google's Auction 1PO,

INVESTORS Bus. DAILY, Aug. 27, 2004, at A4 (citing a former chief economist for the
SEC as saying that the web-based system was too confusing for individual investors due
to its unwieldy interface).
132Google Inc., Amendment No. 9 to Registration Statement (Form S-1), at ii (Aug. 18,
2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504142742/ds 1a.htm.
133 Form S-I, supra note 123, at 18 (describing how Google may set an initial public
offering price that "is near or equal to the clearing price").
Id. at 29.
135 Dawn Kawamoto
134

& Stefanie Olsen, Google Gets to Wall Street and Lives, CNET
NEWS.COM, Aug. 19, 2004, http://news.com.com/2100-1038_35317091.html?legacy cnet.
136 See, e.g., David A. Vise, Bidding Opens New Chapterfor Tech 'God' Google,
WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2004, at El; Global Agenda, Google's IPO Rollercoaster,
Economist.com, Aug. 20, 2004, available at
http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?story id El PTDPJTG.
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and
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1

disclosures regarding potential liability for a Playboy interview published
during the IPO's quiet period. 139 Critics also argue that demand was
suppressed because of industry response to Google's choice of IPO
format. 4 0 However, an established underwriter could have enforced
discipline among analysts and brokers so that these missteps were not
seized upon by the demand network. In effect, one can theorize that due to
backlash from the bookbuilding demand network, Google actually captured
82% of (X-Z). One financial reporter makes this claim in this post-IPO
review:
The "go it alone" method that Google used was a total fiasco, just
ridiculous. The arrogance, the incompetence was beyond belief.
Their own missteps and misbehavior have brought much lower
prices than they ever would have gotten for the deal. Institutions,
mutual funds and hedge funds all are boycotting the deal. So the
price will be artificially low. These guys will have totally messed it
up for themselves. 141
One question that Google's IPO raises is why did the founders of Google
choose to capture 82% of (X-Z) and not 100% of (X-Z)? If rumors are
correct and successful bidders in the IPO received 75% of their bids, then
the assumption must be that the IPO was oversubscribed at $85.142 If the
137Google Inc., Amendment No. 8 to Registration Statement (Form S-i), at 19 (Aug.

16, 2004), availableat
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504141762/dsla.htm.
138Amendment No. 7, supra note 129, at 21-22.
139 David Sheff, Google Guys, PLAYBOY, Sept. 2004, at 55.
140The share price rose almost continuously from the first day, reaching close to $300
per share in the first nine months of trading. Growing institutional demand, which may
have been suppressed at the time of the auction, helped this price increase. For
example, Fidelity Investments bought 15% of Google's Class A shares in the first
month of trading. See Gregory Zuckerman and Kevin J. Delaney, Heard on the Street:
Google Rallies, Shakes QffSome of the Skeptics, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2004, at C4.
Growing institutional investor demand both supported and followed the share price, and
by December 2004, 89% of Google's float was held by institutional investors. Bambi
Francisco, Getting Google Religion: Even the Skeptics are Converting,
MARKETWATCH.COM, Nov. 30, 2004, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/getting-

googlereligion/story.aspx?guid-%/7B079012530%02DFC58%/2D427B%/2DB691%/2D77B23B6
4738D%7D.
141James J. Cramer, How to Buy Google: After the Deal,REALMONEY.COM, Aug. 18,
2004, http://www.thestreet.com/p/ rms/rmoney/jamesjcramer/10178902.html.
142 See IPO Watch: Pop Goes the Google, RED HERRING (Aug. 22, 2004),
http://www.redherring.com/Home/10805 ("In a nutshell, the offering price of $85 per
share had to be below the clearing price."). See also Kevin J. Delaney, Gregory
Zuckerman & Robin Sidel, Google Is Allowred to Continue Along Its Bumpy Road to
IPO By Issuing Revised SEC Filing,WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2004, at CI (providing
anecdotal evidence that most bids were in the $108 to $135 range or higher).
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founders and their investment bankers had chosen an offering price that was
closer to the true clearing price, the highest price at which all shares would
have been subscribed, the offering price may have been closer to the market
price. Assuming that on the day of the IPO the most that the issuer could
have captured would have been 100% of (X-Z), the decreased market
demand, the issuer seemed to have made a decision to capture less. Indeed,
the numbers seem to suggest that Google chose to underprice itself. If
underpricing is generally thought to occur either to provide investment
banks with a currency with which to reward or entice customers or, in a
more generous view, to compensate first customers with providing pricing
information before the offering, then the Google underpricing in its online
auction seems to have no purpose whatsoever.
However, a persuasive explanation can be offered for the
intentional underpricing.
Most participants agree that there were not
enough bids on August 18 to allocate all the shares at $135. With only
hours left in the bidding process, Page and Brin drastically lowered the
price range, with the resulting $85 per share being 58% of the highest
suggested $135 price, but they also reduced the number of shares that they
personally would sell at that price. 4 3 Instead, they were able to sell shares
180 days later at a much higher price once they shrank the supply. Perhaps
Page and Brin determined that the clearing price would not approach either
the market price of Google (X) or the market price with increased demand
sometimes generated in an IPO (X + Y). Instead of selling the bulk of their
stakes at the reduced price of (X-Z), they decided to let others sell at the
underpriced offering price of 85% of (X-Z). Perhaps they realized that
because so many investors were waiting to buy in the aftermarket that a
"pop" with reduced supply would attract otherwise wary investors 144 who
would raise the price beyond (X-Z) to something closer to X or even
(X+Y). In a traditional bookbuilding offering, the investment bank can
manipulate both the price and the number of shares offered for resale to
ensure that certain parties capture part of the demand curve. Likewise,
Google insiders may have manipulated the share price to accomplish the
same thing.
In fact, Page and Brin were able to time the sale of their stock to
coincide with share price increases. Although the founders could not
possibly have predicted that the share price would increase to almost $300
per share less than one year later, they each were able to sell shares in June

143Amendment

No. 9, supra note 131, at 2 (showing that the large reduction of shares

from 25.7 million to 19,605,052 would be achieved by selling fewer insider shares in
the offering).
144 Griffith, supra note 5, at 605 (noting that issuers must weigh
increasing investor
enthusiasm for underpricing against the cost of the underpricing).
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2005 worth over $100 million at the time, 145 receiving about three and onehalf times the value they would have if they had sold the same shares in the
August 2004 IPO.
In any event, the end result of the Google auction process may be
preferable to the bookbuilding system. The optimal system would have
captured increased demand for the benefit of the issuer, not the founders,
and perhaps Page and Brin were able to accomplish that through means
other than the auction system. At least in the Google scenario, the spoils of
the IPO went to the individuals who created the successful company, not
the financial intermediaries. However, the online auction process alone
does not seem to hold this promise for most issuers.
E. Overstock.corn
No description of Wall Street backlash would be complete without
some mention of the travails of Overstock.com 146 in its first five years as a
public company. When Overstock.corn went public in 2002, the CEO,
Patrick Byrne, chose to use Hambrecht's OpeniPO platform. In Byrne's
opinion, this is when Wall Street began to sour on his company, which had
once been very attractive to traditional investment banks courting its public
offering. Once Byrne announced his decision, the investment banks did not
want any part of the IPO and refused to provide research coverage for
Overstock.com shares. Since the offering, Byrne has been very public in
his distaste for Wall Street banks, analysts, financial reporters, institutional
investors and hedge funds.
One comparison of two Overstock.com follow-on offerings does
provide a stark look at the difference between an offering with no Wall
Street demand support and one with that support.
In May 2004,
Overstock.com conducted a follow-on offering using OpenIPO. According
to Byrne, many buyers that he was counting on to bid never participated in
the auction. Surprisingly, the resulting offering price was lower than the
current market price for the same Overstock.corn shares. In November of
that same year, Overstock.com conducted a second follow-on offering of
stock and convertible notes using three Wall Street firms and Hambrecht as
a fourth participant in the syndicate. These shares were sold using the
bookbuilding method. Notably, this offering generated coverage from
analysts associated with the underwriters. The price of the shares rose 82%

145Wall

Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com (click on "Company Research," choose

"GOOG," click on "Insider Transactions") (last visited Nov. 27, 2007) (showing sales
by date for all insider sales).
146According to one of Overstock.com's legal representatives, Theodore Griffinger, Jr.,
Overstock.com is the world's second largest online retailer with $900 million in annual
revenue. See Mike McKee, Something Else for Analysts to Watch: Overstock com's
Libel Suit, THE RECORDER, Mar. 28, 2007,

at

1.
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to a fifty-two week high in December, even though financial reports from
the company were not promising.
However, beginning in 2005, Byrne had cut most ties with the Wall
Street demand network and alleged that various factions were conspiring
against him to depress Overstock.com's share price so that a "Sith Lord"
could buy the company from him. 147 Obviously, statements such as these
do not generate favorable press. However, just because someone is
paranoid does not mean that someone is not out to get that person. Byrne
has complained for years that short sellers are entering into "naked shorts"
on Overstock.com stock, which puts excessive downward pressure on the
stock price. These types of transactions violate SEC rules, and even though
the SEC is keeping a watch list of companies whose stocks are shorted
without physical delivery of the borrowed stock, the SEC has not pursued
these traders. The SEC has taken no action, even though Overstock.com
has been on this list for over 500 consecutive trading days, a fact that is
almost unfathomable. In response, Overstock.com and several shareholders
have filed a lawsuit in California state court against major Wall Street
investment banks, including Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Bear
Stearns, Banc of America, Bank of New York, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, and
Merrill Lynch, for facilitating these illegal trades. 14
Whether the Morgan Stanley lawsuit will be successful remains to
be seen, but Overstock.com has had success in the California state courts
with another lawsuit. In 2005, Overstock.com sued Gradient Analytics, Inc.
(formerly Camelback Research Alliance, Inc. ("Camelback")), Rocker
Partners and its managing partners Marc Cohodes and David Rocker, and
various other individuals, alleging libel, intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage, and violations of various California
statutes. 149
Overstock alleged a very sinister securities trading plot.
According to the appellate court opinion, Gradient "provides analytical
reporting services" for a substantial fee to subscribing customers. 150
However, part of the business model for this reporting service was that
147See

Bethany McLean, Phantom Menace, FORTUNE, Nov. 14, 2005, at 187, 187-88

(quoting Byrne from an August 12 conference call when he "launched into a rant about
a 'miscreants ball' in which he mentioned hedge funds, journalists, investigators, trial
lawyers, the SEC, and even Eliot Spitzer. 'I believe there's been a plan since we were
in our teens to destroy our stock, drive it down to $6-$10 ... and even a plan for how
the company would then get whacked up."').
148 Complaint at 2-5, Overstock.com, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No.
CGC-07460147 (San Francisco County Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 2007) (alleging conversion, trespass
to chattels, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and violations
of California statutes by participating "in a massive, illegal stock market manipulation
scheme").
149 First Amended Complaint, Overstock com, Inc. v. GradientAnalytics,
Inc., 61 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 29 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (No. CV053693) [hereinafter GradientComplaint].
150 Overstock corn, Inc. v. GradientAnalytics, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 34 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2007).
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customers could request "custom reports" on specific companies, and
customers would negotiate the content of these reports." 5 ' According to a
former Camelback employee, subscribers of Gradient-generated custom
reports were able to influence what was contained in the report by
supplying the information Gradient would include in the report and by
152
instructing Gradient to produce a positive or negative report..
Such a
relationship was common knowledge at Gradient and, in essence, facilitated
customers who were involved in the practice of selling companies short.
Customers would request negative reports on specific companies and even
request delaying the release of these reports until the customers could
acquire their short positions. 153 Gradient touted its services to prospective
subscribers by tracking its ability to affect stock performance. For example,
Gradient kept lists of "Blow ups," or "companies which suffered a one-day
decline of -20 percent or more in
the price of their stock" as a result of the
154
publication of a Gradient report.
The complaint specifically alleges that Rocker Partners requested
numerous negative reports on Overstock.com, which Gradient provided in
2005, in order to gain profits by short selling Overstock.com shares. 1 55
56
Although the allegations were generally ignored by the financial media,1
this suit has survived both a motion to dismiss and an appeal of the denial
of that motion based on the holding that the plaintiffs established a
probability of prevailing on the merits. 157 Any damages received by the
151Id. at 35-36.
152
Id at 35.
153 Id.
114 Id. at

35-36.

155Gradient Complaint at 6-7 (listing no fewer than twenty-four reports between Jan.
17, 2005 and June 13, 2005).
156
See McLean, supra note 146, at 187-88 (dismissing Byrne's complaints against
Gradient as "paranoid fantasy" and noting that "[a]ll the parties named in the lawsuit
deny any wrongdoing, and David Rocker says he is preparing a dismissal motion and
countersuit"). McLean may, like other financial journalists, be predisposed against
suits against analysts and journalists who speak negatively about public companies.
McLean wrote a seminal article in Fortune questioning Enron's financial reports that
became a key component in the revelations of accounting fraud that occurred at Enron
and led to a book co-written by McLean. See Bethany McLean, Is Enron Overpriced?,
FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 2001, at 123; BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST

(2003).
However, McLean presumably was not shorting Enron's stock when she published her
objective article, which tends to distinguish the Gradient reports from other analyst
markets published and disseminated in the market.
157 Overstock.com, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 38, 48 ("The malice is in the very business
model and practices that preordain negative reports and provides probative evidence
that Gradient acted in reckless disregard of the truth in making the false statements and
implications that it did."). Apparently, the panel was convinced by the briefs to let the
lawsuit continue, as one justice stated at oral argument that even at the pleading stage
there was sufficient evidence to likely substantiate Overstock.com's claims. See Mike
GuYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON
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plaintiffs in this case would be calculated according to the amount the stock
price declined as a result of the tortious conduct. 5'
Although blaming all of Overstock.com's woes on its not selecting
a traditional underwriter for its IPO might be hyperbolic, certainly
Overstock.com's journey as a public company provides a few cautionary
tales for those who consider circumventing Wall Street's demand network
for not only an online auction IPO but also for general investment banking
needs. 159 Perhaps after litigation is concluded, future issuers will be able to
determine whether Overstock.com did suffer an industry-wide backlash for
its maverick attitude.
IV.

THE FUTURE OF AUCTION IPOs

In conclusion, the future of auction IPOs in the U.S. may not be so
bright after all. Although the IPO Advisory Committee reported that the
auction and bookbuilding methods should compete in the marketplace to
determine which is preferable,1 60 such competition may never materialize.
As long as traditional Wall Street investment banks choose not to offer the
auction method, then the only auction alternative available to issuers is the
one that operates outside the Wall Street demand network of analysts,
brokers, and financial reporters. The future does not hold much promise for
traditional investment banks to offer an online auction method because that
method is not as lucrative for them as the bookbuilding method, which
provides opportunities to use pre-IPO allocations to build profitable
goodwill with investment banking clients and brokerage customers.
Without the option of an online auction with access to a demand
network, an issuer is not choosing between the ideal auction return of 100%
of X and the theoretical bookbuilding return of 80% of X. Instead, the
issuer is choosing between an auction return of 100% of a reduced X, or (XZ) or 80% of an increased X, or (X + Y). In most instances, .80(X + Y)
McKee, Court's OK Likely in Overstock.corn's Stock Libel Suit, THE

RECORDER, Apr.

11, 2007, No. 70, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id 1176282246984.
158

Fortunately for the plaintiffs in this case, the court did not require them to meet the

higher pleading standards for securities law "fraud on the market" cases to survive a
motion to dismiss. See Overstockcom, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 52. During the general
time period that Gradient was issuing negative reports on Overstock, Overstock's stock
price dropped from $73 per share to under $30 per share. Id. at 37.
159Although

not the topic of this article, an interesting research study would analyze

whether OpenIPO firms generally suffer from lack of Wall Street research coverage and
whether this lack of coverage reduces overall returns. See Oh, supra note 8, at 27-28
(calculating that "66.67% of all OpenIPOs have experienced negative three-year
returns," with the average OpeniPO experiencing a share price decline of 3.3 %,
compared with an average 20.4% three-year return for all IPOs).
160See IPO ADVISORY COMM. REPORT, supra note 83, at 1, 9 ("The
market, and not
regulators, should determine whether bookbuilding, a Dutch auction or another method
is desirable for a particular IPO.").
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will be greater than 1.0(X - Z); therefore, rational issuers will choose the
bookbuilding method. The few issuers who choose the auction IPO will do
so for mainly symbolic reasons. 161 Unless regulators become inspired to
forbid practices that allow underwriters to inappropriately influence market
price, whether through analyst conflicts, laddering, tying agreements, or
other methods, the bookbuilding underwriters will continue to have the
competitive advantage.

161See Fleischer, supra note 121, at 1605 (noting that many online auction users,
including Google and Overstock.com, have created personas so that the public sees
them as "contrarian, egalitarian, and user-oriented" such as Peet's Coffee & Tea,
RedEnvelope and Salon.com).

